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BRIAN AITKEN*
The decline in cash revenue in Russia has been the key macroeconomic policy
failure of the transition. During 1994–98, a sharp deterioration in cash compli-
ance was offset by a rise in non-cash revenue, as the government increasingly
financed its spending through mutual arrears write-offs. This paper argues that the
fall in cash compliance emerged when money printing was replaced with a method
of budget financing that did not, in the short run, compromise the government’s
goals of low inflation, a stable exchange rate, and low interest rates, but which
ultimately has led the government into a low cash revenue trap. [JEL: H26, H30,
E62, E65, O23]
R
ussia’s macroeconomic policy has been dogged for years by the federal
government’s failure to collect enough cash revenue. Cash collection has
fallen short of budget targets as an annual event, and every year the large budget
gaps have been filled by spending arrears and additional short-term borrowing.
The combination of growing debt and shrinking revenues naturally alarmed cred-
itors, and it is not surprising that confidence ultimately gave way in the summer of
1998 with disastrous consequences for the government.
What is surprising though, given what was at stake, is that the government did
not act more forcefully to reverse the revenue decline. The government clearly
understood that its major achievements—low inflation and a predictable exchange
rate—were increasingly jeopardized by chronically low revenue. Why then was it
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revenue low, or was collecting taxes merely a question of “political will”? If the
reasons were not technical, why would the government have allowed political
considerations to dictate a policy that was clearly selfdestructive?
In this paper, I argue that the revenue decline was brought about by a budget
practice that was actually quite sensible from a short-run perspective—namely, the
virtual budget, or the practice of offsetting tax and expenditure arrears. The rise of
the virtual budget, however, triggered a fundamental shift in taxpayer compliance
as enterprises discovered that they could benefit from tax offsets by accumulating
tax arrears. Falling cash compliance further aggravated the government’s need for
financing, which, ironically, made offsets appear even more attractive as a short-
run solution. This set in motion a vicious circle where the expectation that tax
arrears would be offset became a self-fulfilling prophesy. With the practice of
offsets firmly entrenched, expectations could be changed, and compliance
improved, only through a long and painful campaign against tax delinquents with
a great short-run loss in non-cash budget financing. In this sense, the government
was caught in a low cash revenue trap. By mid-1998, it was simply too late for
fresh revenue raising efforts to prevent devaluation and default.
The key event setting this process in motion was the elimination of the infla-
tion tax, when the government stopped printing money but did not support this
with adequate cuts in expenditure. Instead of more drastic expenditure cuts, the
government sought to replace money printing with budget financing that would
not in the short run compromise its goals of low inflation, a stable exchange rate,
and low interest rates.
The revenue decline is described in several stages. First, a fundamental change
in taxpayer behavior took place beginning in 1995 as cash compliance, which had
been more or less constant during 1992–94, fell sharply. Second, the elimination
of the inflation tax led to the rise in the virtual budget. I argue that the virtual
budget reduced the incentives for enterprises to pay taxes as well as for the govern-
ment to punish tax delinquents. Finally, a simple model of tax compliance is devel-
oped to show how these developments can be characterized as a low revenue trap.
In considering the arguments in this paper, it is useful to keep in mind at least
one possible alternative explanation for the revenue decline based loosely on the
Gaddy and Ickes (1998) model of the virtual economy.1 In this alternative, enter-
prises don’t choose cash compliance, except perhaps at the margin. Instead, they
can be thought to pay in cash only “what they can.” If during high inflation, for
example, seigniorage was transferred from households to enterprises in the form
of budget subsidies, then eliminating the inflation tax might have reduced the pool
of real resources from which enterprises could pay taxes. Cash revenue might be
expected to fall even if the measured tax liability, which is a reflection of virtual
economic activity, did not. While I do not reject this alternative, I discuss some
reasons why it is not an entirely persuasive explanation of the revenue decline. In
addition, I discuss what implications it might have for reversing the decline.
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1Gaddy and Ickes (1998). In their paper, Gaddy and Ickes do not model tax compliance directly, but
argue that cash revenue collection can be increased only by redirecting enterprises’ cash proceeds away
from other expenses such as wages.I. Federal Revenue Developments
In this section, I focus on tax revenue developments of the federal govern-
ment. For data reasons, I set aside questions regarding local government revenues
(comprised of 89 separate regions) and payroll tax revenues accruing to the
pension fund, social insurance fund, and other extrabudgetary funds.2
Federal cash revenue has declined sharply since 1992 (Table 1). Much of the
decline during the period 1992–94 is explained by explicit changes in tax policy,
such as a reduction in the VAT and profits tax rates and a phasing out of export
duties. These changes are also reflected in a decline in the assessed tax liability,
which can be estimated quite simply using data on tax arrears as assessed by the
state tax service and confirmed by enterprises, including deferrals but excluding
fines and interest penalties.3 Since tax policy changes during 1992–94 are
discussed elsewhere, I will not focus on them in this paper.4
After 1994, however, the revenue decline took on a very different character.
During this period, cash collections fell by as much as 2!/2 percent of GDP despite
a modest increase in the assessed tax liability (see also Figure 1); the share of the
assessed liability paid in cash—or cash compliance—fell from 89 percent in 1994
to 65 percent in 1996. Despite this fall, total revenue including non-cash receipts
has been steady since 1994. The figures for non-cash revenue simply reflect the
quantity of tax arrears cleared through one of the government-sponsored offset
schemes, which I will discuss in more detail below.
II. Implications for Common Explanations of 
the Poor Revenue Performance
Before turning to the reasons for the deterioration in cash compliance and the
rise in non-cash revenue, it is important to note what the stability of the tax
liability implies about many of the commonly cited explanations for the poor
Brian Aitken
182
2Data on local government and extrabudgetary revenues are especially difficult to interpret. Local
governments are widely believed to systematically underreport their revenue, mainly because the distri-
bution of federal transfers is in part determined by local revenue shortfalls. In addition, an unknown share
of revenues and expenditures reported by local governments and some extrabudgetary funds take place
through non-cash transactions such as through mutual arrears clearing operations. While the share of these
operations is believed to be large and growing, the absence of a time series prevents cash and non-cash
revenue developments from being analyzed separately. Aside from these concerns, however, there is no
fundamental reason why the arguments in this paper cannot be extended to local and extrabudgetary
revenues.
3Total revenue is based on official Russian treasury figures excluding privatization proceeds and
proceeds from sales of stocks of precious metals, and is composed of cash revenue and non-cash revenue
(tax offsets). Tax offsets are recorded as revenue in the treasury figures when the offset transaction takes
place, rather than when the tax liability was incurred. Data on changes in the stock of tax arrears come
from the state tax service, and exclude fines and penalties. The total tax liability as assessed by the state
tax service is estimated by adding total revenue to the change in the stock of tax arrears. An “adjusted tax
liability,” shown in Table 1, is estimated by adjusting for differences in timing between when a taxable
transaction actually took place and when a tax liability was later formally incurred as part of an offset
operation.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.revenue performance in Russia. For this, it is first useful to decompose cash
revenue in the following way.
cash tax  cash tax observed  cash
revenue = liability  x compliance = rate   x tax base   x compliance
Here cash compliance is taken to mean, by definition, the share of the tax
liability as assessed by the tax service that is paid in cash. Changes in cash revenue
will reflect changes in tax rates, the observed base (as measured by the tax
service), or cash compliance. Anything that affects tax rates or the observed base
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Sources: Russian Treasury, state tax service, and author's calculations.will also affect the assessed tax liability. For example, a reduction in the value-
added tax (VAT) rate, an increase in VAT exemptions, or an increase in under-
reporting of economic activity will all lead to a decline in the assessed VAT
liability. If we see that the assessed VAT liability has been stable, then none of
these factors could cause a decline in overall cash revenue.
In fact, there is a long list of commonly cited reasons for the poor revenue
performance in Russia that fail to explain the recent revenue decline. Many of the
reasons focus on a shrinking of the measured tax base, either due to exemptions
and tax concessions or through tax evasion related to underreporting of production
and the growth of the informal economy.5 But, in order for these factors to explain
the revenue decline after 1994, they would require a corresponding fall in the
measured tax liability.
Likewise, changes in tax policy also fail to explain the revenue decline after
1994. As is clear from Figure 1, for example, the liability for some taxes, such as
export taxes and the profits tax, declined after 1994. These changes, however, were
offset by an increase in the liability for other taxes such as excises and VAT. More
important for the decline in overall cash revenue, cash compliance for each of the
major taxes worsened beginning in 1995.
Finally, widely recognized tax administration problems such as the
complexity of the tax system and a dysfunctional state tax service could have
played a role in the revenue decline only insofar as they explain why assessed
taxes were not collected. A corrupt, poorly focused, poorly trained, and poorly
funded tax service, an administratively complex VAT and profits tax, a lack of
established audit procedures, and a proliferation of transfer pricing might have
hindered correct tax assessment and contributed to tax evasion, but revenue devel-
opments show that problems assessing tax liabilities cannot be driving the revenue
decline.
To summarize, there are many factors that might be used to argue why revenue
was not higher than it in fact was, or why Russia has failed to achieve its full
revenue potential. But the stable tax liability implies that the fall in taxpayer
compliance must be the driving force behind the revenue decline after 1994.
III. The Rise in the Virtual Budget
One of the notable features of the decline in cash compliance is that it was
more or less offset by a rise in non-cash revenue, but this does not mean that the
government simply began allowing enterprises the choice of paying taxes in cash
or in kind. In fact, I argue that the decline in cash compliance was caused by the
government’s desire to maintain expenditure following the elimination of the
inflation tax. I make this argument in two stages. First, in this section, I show that
the rise in non-cash revenue, and correspondingly non-cash expenditure, emerged
when the government substituted one form of soft financing—-money printing—
for another—tax offsets. Second, I argue that the virtual budget, or the practice of
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5See, for example, OECD (1997), Ickes, Murrell, and Ryterman (1997).carrying out expenditures and collecting revenues in non-cash form, created an
environment in which enterprises benefited greatly by reducing their cash
compliance.
Throughout the period 1992–97, cash spending fell well short of the budgeted
level (Table 2). Since spending commitments were made based on the budgeted
limits, the shortfall in cash spending led directly to an increase in federal govern-
ment spending arrears. Prior to 1995, these arrears were mostly cleared in cash
within the spending limits of the following year. At that time, clearing arrears was
not especially difficult since (1) high inflation significantly reduced the cost to the
budget in real terms of clearing arrears in the following year; and (2) spending in
excess of identified financing was generously covered by inflationary money
creation. By the end of 1993, for example, the federal government had run Rub
4 billion in spending arrears, or about 2.3 percent of 1993 GDP, which were to be
cleared within the spending limits of the 1994 budget. These arrears amounted to
less than  /3 of 1 percent of GDP in 1994. High inflationary financing allowed the
government to run arrears each year and at the same time keep the real stock of
arrears from growing.
Budget practices shifted in 1995, when the government strengthened its efforts
to control inflation by sharply reducing monetary financing of the budget (Table 2).
Keeping inflation down meant that spending arrears could no longer be cleared by
printing money. To break with this practice the federal government chose to clear
its stock of 1994 arrears by issuing special treasury obligations (KOs) to suppliers.
The cash burden of repaying these obligations was minimized by giving suppliers
the option of using them to clear outstanding tax arrears, which when cleared were
booked as non-cash revenue.
As a one-time measure, issuing special treasury obligations was a convenient
way of clearing past arrears. However, spending arrears continued to mount in
1995; even though budgeted expenditures were reduced sharply in that year, cash
spending fell short of the budgeted level by nearly 2!/2 percent of GDP. In addition
Brian Aitken
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Table 2. Russia: Shortfall in Federal Government Expenditure 
Relative to Budget, 1992–97
(Percent of GDP)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Non-interest expenditure
Budget . . . 20.6 22.7 14.9 16.3 16.5
Cash execution 26.0 18.3 20.8 12.6 11.2 11.7
Cash shortfall relative to budget . . . 2.3 1.9 2.3 5.1 4.8
Memorandum items:
Monetary financing of the 
federal budget  . . . 6.5 9.7 2.7 2.3 1.3
Annual average inflation (in percent) 1735 875 307 197 48 15
Sources: Russian Treasury, state tax service, and author’s calculations.to the measured shortfall, unbudgeted spending related to the war in Chechnya, the
run-up to parliamentary elections in late 1995, and presidential elections in mid-
1996 added to the cash shortfall.
As spending arrears mounted, the federal government came under heavy pres-
sure to “clear the books” once again by offsetting these arrears against the tax
arrears of enterprises. The result was a succession of mutual arrears clearance
schemes, or tax offsets. The mechanics of each offset scheme differed, but in all
cases the federal budget cleared its arrears to suppliers by issuing a claim on the
government that could be used to pay tax arrears.6 Each scheme was intended only
as a bookkeeping exercise to clear past—and not current—arrears, but the sequen-
tial and ongoing nature of the schemes meant that they de facto financed current
expenditures (Table 3). By 1996, over one-fourth of total federal revenue took the
form of non-cash tax offsets.
IV. The Virtual Budget and the Fall in Cash Compliance
The emergence of the virtual budget triggered a fall in cash compliance for two
reasons: (1) tax offsets increased the benefits to enterprises of running tax arrears;
and (2) tax offsets reduced the government’s incentive to penalize tax delinquents.
Impact of Offsets on Taxpayer Incentives
As I have noted, each of the offset schemes was intended to clear only past tax
arrears and did not relieve taxpayers of the need to pay current tax liabilities in
cash. Repeated episodes of “one-time,” “final” offset schemes confirmed enter-
prises’expectation, however, that, as long as the budget was running arrears, there
would be another offset scheme in the future. To participate in a future offset, an
enterprise needed tax arrears.
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6See Crotty and others (1997) for a complete description of the various offset schemes.
Table 3. Russia: Federal Government Expenditures Financed 
Through Offsets, 1992–97
(Percent of GDP)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Expenditures financed through offsets
by budget year 0.0 0.0 1.6 3.2 3.9 2.2
by date of offset transaction 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.6 3.0 3.1
Memorandum Item:
Total federal non-interest expenditures 26.3 18.3 21.2 14.6 14.6 14.4
Sources: Russian Treasury, state tax service, and author’s calculations.It is clear why enterprises supplying state orders might prefer to settle their tax
liabilities effectively “in kind” through mutual arrears clearing rather than in cash.
Many of the enterprises supplying the government, such as in the defense sector,
have few alternative markets for their goods. The prices these enterprises charge
the government are commonly believed to be well in excess of the cash value of
the goods in a competitive market. Selling goods to the government on credit, and
then using this credit to write off tax liabilities, was one way for enterprises to
realize profits on their less marketable goods. Even profitable enterprises, such as
Gazprom, also benefited from trade in kind with the government. Pipeline
constraints effectively limited the supply of natural gas to the export market where
Gazprom’s profits were greatest and customers paid in cash. In contrast, the cash
value of supplying an additional unit of gas to the domestic market was quite low,
far below the contract price that Gazprom was able to charge for supplying gas to
government agencies. With low marginal costs of production, Gazprom had a clear
incentive to build up tax arrears on its exports, and then clear those arrears by
offsetting them against its sales to the government.
While it is not surprising that enterprises that were owed money by the budget
would run up tax arrears, a crucial feature of the various offset schemes is that they
extended the potential benefits of tax arrears to all enterprises whether or not
enterprises had any direct link to the federal budget. In all the offset schemes, the
enterprise holding the claim on the budget could, whether or not it was explicitly
allowed, trade this claim to another enterprise wishing to use the claim to clear tax
arrears. In some schemes the claims were securitized, and an active and highly
lucrative secondary market quickly developed. Other schemes required chains of
debtors and creditors, with the budget on one end and the tax delinquent on the
other. In these cases, claims were effectively traded through bogus post-dated
contracts and side agreements between firms.
The main point is that offsets reduced the incentive to pay taxes in cash for all
enterprises in the economy. Offsets were particularly valuable to the more politi-
cally exposed large enterprises. The Karpov Commission found that in their
sample of the 210 largest tax delinquents, less than 8 percent of payments to the
federal budget during 1996 and the first half of 1997 took the form of cash.7
Likewise, the potential gains from offsets were particularly large for enterprises
with profitable cash markets but no direct claim on the budget. As such, it is no
surprise that the tax arrears of the oil sector rose sharply in advance of the widely
anticipated offset exercise that took place in late 1997 (Table 4).
The Government’s Response to Falling Tax Compliance
One might expect that the government, having lost the inflation tax as a source
of financing, would do everything in its power to improve tax compliance. After
all, the government knew precisely which enterprises owed what taxes, and the list
of the largest tax delinquents was publicly known. Why then did the government
tolerate the decline in compliance? This is somewhat of a paradox and critical in
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7Report of the Interdepartmental Balance Commission (1997).explaining why cash compliance actually fell. The answer is that in the short run
the government found tax offsets to be a less costly alternative, from both the
political and financial points of view, to taking steps against tax delinquents.
Enforcing cash compliance is politically costly to the government. Sanctions
against tax delinquents such as seizing assets and bankrupting enterprises can be
effective only if they inflict pain on owners and managers, either by stripping
ownership or shutting down the operations of the enterprise. By their nature then,
sanctions will involve some short-run political cost to the government; owners and
managers are often politically powerful, particularly when closely allied with
regional governments, and displaced workers are not likely to be sympathetic to
the federal government’s cause. But if threats against tax delinquents are to be
credible, taxpayers need to perceive the government as willing to carry out these
threats to their conclusion despite the political costs.
At the same time, the sanctions against taxpayers rarely provide any direct
short-run financial benefit to the government. One potentially cost-effective sanc-
tion would be seizing the liquid assets of delinquent enterprises. However, enter-
prises have increasingly resorted to barter and use of money surrogates, such as
veksels and arrears, and as a result rarely have any liquid assets to seize.8 In the
Karpov Commission’s sample of large tax delinquents, for example, some 57
percent of the enterprises received less than 20 percent of their total revenue in
cash form. Based on this sample, the Commission concluded that “. . . it makes no
sense to apply fiscal punishment measures directed at finding and arresting
accounts of the majority of ‘classical’ industrial enterprises. Indeed, there is
FALLING TAX COMPLIANCE AND THE RISE OF THE VIRTUAL BUDGET IN RUSSIA
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Table 4. Russian Federation: Federal Tax Arrears of the 100 Largest Tax
Debtors, by Sector
(End of period stock in billions of rubles)
December July October April Sepember December April September
1995 1996 1996 1997 1997 1997 1998 1998
Auto 1.8 4.0 4.4 4.7 5.2 5.9 5.7 5.3
Coal 0.1 0.1 — 0.2 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.7
Energy 2.3 2.6 2.3 4.0 5.7 5.7 5.0 6.7
Gas 1.9 6.2 6.8 7.9 5.1 8.0 10.5 16.7
Oil 5.6 10.4 12.3 10.5 13.1 9.1 4.6 5.3
Rail 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.2 3.6 3.9 3.3 4.9
Other 0.4 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.7 3.8
Total 15.6 27.2 29.6 32.7 35.5 35.6 33.5 43.2
Memorandum item:
Total federal tax arrears 30 58 74 82 96 104 120 146
Sources: Russian Treasury, state tax service, and author’s calculations.
8The state tax service has the legal authority to block a tax delinquent’s bank accounts and force all
current revenues into a single settlement account that is applied to the payment of tax debts. Hendley,
Ickes, and Ryterman (1998) discuss the increasing use of barter and other non-cash transactions as a way
of evading seizure of revenues through the single settlement account system.nothing there to find.”9 I set aside the question of why these enterprises are cash
starved, and there certainly is evidence to suggest that they are cash starved by
design. In any case, seizing liquid assets of tax delinquents is rarely an effective
option.
As an alternative, the tax authorities on occasion seize non-liquid productive
assets of enterprises. For legal and political reasons, however, an enterprise’s
assets can only be seized piece by piece, rather than as a coherent whole.10
Moreover, until the federal debt center was established in mid-1998 there was not
even a centralized market outlet for the sale of seized property. For these reasons,
seized assets have had very little cash value. Indeed, seizing physical assets has
been such a logistical headache that the tax authorities have been known to declare
assets “seized” without bothering to remove them from enterprise premises. The
result has been that, regardless of the book value of the assets seized, the cash
proceeds from seizure and sale of productive assets have been a negligible fraction
of the volume of tax arrears cleared through offsets.
Tax offsets, on the other hand, offered an alternative to sanctions that made
much more sense to the government from a short-run perspective. Offsets were a
way of capturing the entire nominal value of outstanding tax arrears and chan-
neling it toward the clearance of the already large stock of expenditure arrears of
the budget. At the same time, offsets avoided the political costs associated with
sanctions. From a narrow, short-run point of view, they appeared to all parties to
be a rational solution to a complex set of problems. Enterprises understood this
and, as a result, did not take seriously government threats that painful sanctions
would be taken against tax delinquents.
This explains why a number of extraordinary steps taken by the government
to improve taxpayer discipline generally failed. In late 1996 the government estab-
lished the Emergency Tax Commission (VChK) to review in a high profile manner
the tax liabilities of some of the largest tax debtors. Only in a few cases, however,
did the commission take actions to effectively penalize the enterprises for failing
to clear tax debts. In most cases, consequences such as asset seizure and
bankruptcy were avoided through agreements whereby the enterprises would stay
current on new tax liabilities and restructure old tax debts. When declarations of
tough action were made by the VChK, they were rarely carried out to their conclu-
sion. In fact, the high profile nature of the VChK’s failure to follow through on its
threats could well have contributed further to the decline in cash compliance
(Crotty, and others, 1997).
Several other high profile efforts also proved ineffective in the face of strong
political opposition. In mid-1998, the tax service launched a public campaign to
seize assets of Gazprom subsidiaries, which had been accumulating tax arrears at
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9Interdepartmental Balance Commission (1997).
10In December 1997, the Emergency Tax Commission took a path-breaking decision to seize assets
of several major tax delinquents in the form of seizure of their entire “property complex.” This decision,
by preserving an enterprise’s value-producing operation in tact, would have greatly increased the benefits
to the government of seizure as well as increasing the costs to the enterprise managers and owners. For
these reasons, the decision mobilized the direct opposition of powerful political lobby groups and was
very soon reversed on legal grounds.a rapid pace since the end of 1997 (see Table 4). However, the campaign mobilized
widespread political opposition against the government, and in the end an agree-
ment was reached whereby Gazprom would pay only a part of its current tax
liability in cash. As a result, Gazprom’s tax arrears continued to mount in the
second half of 1998. Likewise, an attempt by the government in mid-1998 to
restrict export access for oil companies with growing tax arrears ran directly
against the interests of powerful lobby groups, and the measure was largely
circumvented in the end.
The failure to enforce tax collection is also reflected in the daily deliberations
regarding lower profile tax delinquents. Of over 1,400 tax delinquent enterprises
reviewed by the regional Interbranch Balancing Commissions during the first six
months of 1998, in only 5 percent of the cases was a decision taken to seize assets.
Although bankruptcy was initiated in about 19 percent of the cases, the poor state
of the bankruptcy law and the quality of the courts prevent bankruptcy from being
regarded as a serious threat. In contrast, in about 40 percent of the cases the tax
debts were either deferred or restructured, or the balancing commission postponed
a decision.11
Reasons for the Fall in Cash Compliance
To summarize, the fall in cash compliance was the product of (1) expenditure
arrears of the budget and (2) a shift in the method of financing these arrears from
money printing to tax offsets. The method of financing contributed to the fall in
compliance by rewarding tax delinquents, while the government’s short-run need
to finance expenditure arrears assured tax delinquents that their behavior would be
tolerated. Since both factors contributed to the decline in cash compliance, simply
declaring an end to tax offsets should not by itself lead to a recovery in cash
revenue. So long as the government is spending in arrears, enterprises are likely to
continue running tax arrears on the expectation that some form of mutual arrears
clearing exercise will need to take place.
V. The Low Revenue Trap in a Model of Cash Compliance
In this section, I bring together the factors that I have argued led to the fall of
cash compliance into a coherent framework. I describe a simple game between the
government—by which I am referring to the fiscal authorities—and enterprises in
which cash compliance is induced by the threat that the government will seize
assets (see Appendix for a complete description). In deciding how to respond to
nonpayment the government determines a seizure policy balancing the cash
revenue gained from seizing assets against the alternative of using unpaid tax
liabilities as an imperfect substitute for cash revenue as a means of financing
expenditure needs.
This model serves two modest but useful purposes. First, it describes clearly
in a static framework the main argument of the paper—that a loss of cash
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11Report of the Interdepartmental Balancing Commission (1998).financing paradoxically increases the government’s willingness to tolerate lower
cash compliance. The second purpose is to illustrate how, over time, the govern-
ment might find itself caught in a low cash revenue trap. In other words, the
government’s short-run goal of financing its expenditures from any means might
outweigh the longer-run desire to finance expenditures from current cash revenue,
leading it to postpone the costly investment of establishing a reputation for not
tolerating tax delinquency. If enterprises understand this, they will challenge the
government’s commitment to enforce cash collection and reduce their compliance,
which will in turn further aggravate the government’s short-run financing
concerns. While the model is fairly simple, it nonetheless provides a basic frame-
work for a richer model to examine these dynamic aspects more thoroughly.
The Government’s Preferences
The model begins with the assumption that the government (again, taken to
mean the fiscal authorities) wishes to finance as much as possible of a given target
expenditure level. In making this assumption, the larger question of how this level
is determined in the first place is deliberately overlooked. This is an important
question, and no attempt is made to answer it here. For the moment, one can
assume that the fiscal authorities are essentially given the expenditure target,
which itself is determined by larger political imperatives.
Assume expenditures can be financed from three sources: (1) cash revenue
collected from enterprises; (2) taxes collected in non-cash form through offsets;
and (3) other sources such as seigniorage or borrowing, which are taken to be
exogenous. By treating them as exogenous, I am assuming that these sources are
determined by factors outside the model, such as a given inflation target in the case
of seigniorage or, in the case of borrowing, the desire to keep domestic real interest
rates low and limit the growth of government debt. As with the target expenditure
level, I do not intend to argue that these sources of financing are outside the
control of the government but are simply limited by other policy goals, which are
taken to be given for the purposes of the model. The model will then allow us to
consider the effects of changes in other sources of financing, for a given target
expenditure level, on cash and non-cash revenue collection.
A key aspect of the model’s setup is the value the government places on cash
revenue compared with other sources of financing. All else equal, the government
would prefer as much financing as possible to come from cash revenue. From a
long-run perspective the solvency of the government depends on its ability to
finance expenditures with revenue, as opposed to borrowing or unsustainable
money printing. With regard to revenue itself, the government has a clear prefer-
ence for cash revenue over non-cash revenue. One reason is that some expendi-
tures, such as wage payments and debt service, simply cannot be paid in kind or
through offsets. Another is that cash is more fungible and does not distort govern-
ment expenditure priorities toward spending on goods that tax delinquents happen
to supply.
While the government prefers cash revenue, it nonetheless has a desire to
finance its target expenditure level, regardless of the source of financing. In other
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revenue collection if at the same time spending fell well short of the target.
Likewise, it is not enough to meet the spending target if spending is financed
entirely through borrowing and non-cash revenue. One useful way to understand
these preferences is in terms of the government’s short-run and long-run concerns:
the government has a short-run desire to meet its spending target, but the long-run
health of the budget would require financing this spending through a greater share
of cash revenue.
In this model, these preferences are characterized in terms of the government’s
indifference curves, shown in Figure 2 (see also Appendix Figure A2). Of course
in reality the government is a composite of many competing preferences, but indif-
ference curves are nonetheless a useful shorthand device for characterizing the
trade-off faced by the government between cash revenue and total revenue. As this
trade-off is modeled, the government would be indifferent to accepting lower cash
revenue only if it were compensated by sufficiently higher total revenue. An
important assumption is that the non-cash revenue needed to compensate the
government for a lost ruble of cash revenue increases as cash revenue reaches
lower levels. As a technical matter, since cash revenue is also a source of total
revenue only the upper half of the figure is relevant for the model. With these pref-
erences in mind, how tax enforcement policies of the government interact with
enterprise behavior to determine cash revenue will now be described.
Cash revenue will depend on the level of cash compliance chosen by enter-
prises. The government can influence the level of cash compliance by threatening
to seize assets of tax delinquents, although seizure can be understood to include any
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(Cash and non-cash)action that is painful to the enterprise managers and disrupts an enterprise’s opera-
tions. Strictly as a practical matter, cash revenue is defined to include any cash
proceeds arising directly from the sale of seized assets. How aggressive the govern-
ment is in enforcing compliance is reflected in its seizure policy, which is revealed
to enterprises as a first step in the model. Enterprises then choose their optimal
compliance based on this policy. The government fully anticipates enterprises’
response when formulating its policy in the first step. As a final step, the govern-
ment carries out its policy based on the actual compliance chosen by enterprises.
Government Pre-Commits to a Seizure Policy
The basic framework is first developed assuming that the government can pre-
commit to carrying out an announced seizure policy. The main advantage to the
government of pre-committing to a tougher seizure policy is that by inducing
greater compliance the government reduces the number of seizures that are actu-
ally needed to meet a cash revenue target. That is to say, the policy announcement
has a signal effect on taxpayer compliance. (Later I consider what happens if the
government cannot pre-commit.)
In the case of pre-commitment, enterprises choose their optimal level of cash
compliance in response to the announced seizure policy. On the one hand, lower
cash compliance exposes enterprises to a higher risk of having their assets seized by
the government, an outcome they regard as costly. On the other hand, by paying less
of their tax liability in cash, enterprises that escape seizure can settle a higher share
of their tax liability in kind or through mutual arrears clearing arrangements such as
offsets. Consistent with the arguments made in Section IV, it is assumed that enter-
prises would rather settle through offsets than in cash. Based on these considera-
tions, overall cash compliance chosen by enterprises will be greater the more
aggressive the government’s announced seizure policy (Appendix equation 4).
Given its preferences, the government faces a trade-off when setting its seizure
policy; in response to non-payment the government can either seize assets or use
unpaid tax liabilities as an imperfect substitute to cash for financing expenditure
needs. One of the assumptions driving the model’s results is that the amount of
cash the government can get directly from seizure—for example, from the subse-
quent sale of assets—is less than the amount of the enterprise’s unpaid tax liability.
When setting its seizure policy, the government weighs the benefits of a more
aggressive policy yielding greater cash proceeds—both directly from seized assets
as well as from the greater cash compliance that the policy will induce—against
the loss of potential non-cash revenue (Appendix equation 10).
The seizure policy the government will choose can be shown graphically by
modifying the indifference curves in Figure 2. As noted above, enterprises will
respond to a more aggressive seizure policy by paying more cash revenue. Since
the government fully anticipates this response, its choice of seizure policy is effec-
tively a choice of the cash revenue it wishes to target. This allows Figure 2 to be
recast in terms of the trade-off between total revenue and the seizure policy, where
the indifference curves of this trade-off have the same properties as the curves in
Figure 2. In addition, the government faces a “budget constraint,” where more
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non-cash revenue is partially offset by cash proceeds arising directly from seizure,
the slope of this constraint will be flatter the higher the proceeds are from seizure
(Appendix Figure A3). The seizure policy chosen by the government is repre-
sented by point a in Figure 3.
An increase in cash proceeds arising directly from seizure would increase the
efficiency of seizure. If the substitution effects of a more efficient seizure policy
were greater than the income effects, the government would respond by
announcing a more aggressive seizure policy. This is shown as a shift from point
a to point b. Enterprises will react by increasing cash compliance.
Within this basic framework, one result of eliminating the inflation tax would
be a fall in cash compliance. The logic is straightforward. Given the government’s
preferences, a loss of non-revenue financing will increase the government’s will-
ingness to forego cash revenue for a higher level of total revenue, effectively flat-
tening the government’s indifference curves. As a result, the government will
adopt a seizure policy that targets a lower level of cash proceeds and greater total
revenue, which is shown in Figure 4 as a shift from point a to point b. Enterprises,
faced with a reduced risk of seizure, will lower their cash compliance, and cash
revenue will decline.
Government Cannot Pre-Commit to a Seizure Policy
Given that seizing assets reduces total revenue, it is clearly in the govern-
ment’s interest to threaten enterprises by announcing an aggressive seizure policy
and then, once enterprises have determined their cash compliance, relax the
seizure policy and convert a greater share of tax arrears into non-cash revenue for
financing the budget. If the government cannot pre-commit, enterprises will









Figure 3.  The Government's Seizure Policyunderstand that the real threat of seizure is less than the stated policy and will chal-
lenge this policy by choosing a lower initial level of compliance. I compare this
result with the pre-commitment equilibrium in Figure 5.
A detailed description of the comparison is included in the Appendix, but the
intuition is straightforward. Whether or not the government pre-commits, enter-
prises will choose compliance based on the seizure policy they expect to be carried
out, with compliance increasing with a higher perceived probability of seizure.
























Figure 5.  Pre-Commitment Versus No Pre-Commitmentgovernment chooses a seizure policy corresponding to point a. If the pre-commit-
ment is credible, enterprises will respond to this policy by choosing cash compli-
ance of φ*. Ex post, however, the government would prefer to deviate from its
announced seizure policy by choosing a less aggressive seizure policy corre-
sponding to point b. If the pre-commitment is not credible, enterprises will antic-
ipate the government’s ex post policy preference, and will select a lower
compliance corresponding to point c. Based on this compliance, the government
will carry out seizures until the marginal benefit of the cash proceeds arising
directly from sales of seized assets equals the marginal cost of lost financing
(p**). This equilibrium is characterized by both lower compliance and fewer
seizures than in the pre-commitment case.
Tax Enforcement in a Dynamic Setting and the Low Revenue Trap
The above comparison is useful in illustrating how, in a static framework, a
low return to enforcing tax compliance in the short run might cause enterprises to
question the credibility of the government’s enforcement policy. But is this true in
a dynamic framework? That is to say, what if the government regards this as a
repeated game? In that case, the government might want to carry out its pre-
announced seizure policy even if this period’s cash revenue benefits are very low.
In a repeated game the government would take into account the consequences of
its actions this period on tax compliance next period. In other words, the govern-
ment might view the costs of enforcing tax compliance as a worthwhile investment
in establishing its reputation, given the future benefits of a credible tax enforce-
ment policy.
Although I have chosen for the sake of simplicity to model a one-time game,
the framework can nonetheless be used to illustrate how short-run and long-run
considerations might compete. If the government takes a long view, it will suffer
the short-run costs of establishing a reputation. If the reverse is true, the govern-
ment could find itself caught in a low cash revenue trap. As shown in the
Appendix, a fall in non-revenue financing, such as through the elimination of the
inflation tax, increases the premium the government places on its short-run goal of
financing its target expenditures by non-cash means (Appendix, Section III). The
temptation to deviate from an announced seizure policy, therefore, could increase
the point that the pre-commitment itself loses credibility. At this point, enterprises
would begin challenging the stated seizure policy, causing compliance to fall by
much more than would be the case under pre-commitment. Given the govern-
ment’s need to finance short-run expenditures, the fall in compliance would
further increase the short-run costs of reestablishing credibility.
This equilibrium can be characterized as a low cash revenue trap. Enterprises
pay little in cash because they know the government’s short-run desire to finance
its expenditure needs through offsets will outweigh its long-run desire to improve
cash compliance. The government, responding to low cash revenue and mounting
expenditure arrears, will confirm enterprises’ expectations. Attempts to break out
of this trap by establishing a reputation for tax enforcement will not be credible as
long as the government’s expenditure needs are unchanged.
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Perhaps the key implication of the model is that the government can only
break out of the revenue trap by cutting expenditures. In this way, the govern-
ment would eliminate its reliance on non-cash revenue as a source of financing
and would be free to enforce cash compliance regardless of the lost financing
that enforcement would imply. Enterprises would understand this and would
respond by increasing cash compliance. As the government establishes a reputa-
tion for enforcing cash compliance, cash revenue will increase and expenditures
can be raised. Ironically, expenditures must first be cut to a lower level than
would be the case if the government could pre-commit to a seizure policy from
the beginning.
This result is closely analogous to the reduction in real balances required to
reduce inflation during a stabilization. If wages and prices are set in a forward-
looking manner, the government could reduce inflation without a fall in real
balances if it were able to pre-commit to a reduction in the rate of money growth.
The pre-commitment would translate into lower inflationary expectations, and
slower wage and price growth, with real balances actually rising as the lower
inflation makes money more attractive. If the policy of lower money growth is
not credible, wages and prices will continue to be set based on higher expected
inflation. In this case, a period of lower real balances and higher real interest
rates would be required before inflation falls to the new rate of money growth.
As in the case of expenditures and cash compliance, real balances must first be
brought down to a level lower than is consistent with the lower inflation in the
long run.
A second implication of the model is that decreasing the payoff to the govern-
ment of seizure makes seizure less credible and increases the amount of seizure
required to enforce a given level of compliance. If the substitution effects exceed
the income effects (as shown in Figure 3), less effective seizure would compel the
government to opt for a weaker policy of tax enforcement and a reduction in the
frequency of seizure.
This second result is important for understanding the rise in barter and other
non-cash transactions between enterprises. As discussed earlier, barter reduces the
reliance on cash, making seizure a less attractive option for the government in
response to non-compliance. In the context of the model, the rise in barter has the
dual effect of emboldening enterprises to reduce compliance and weakening the
government’s determination to fight non-compliance. It is no surprise then that the
sharp rise in non-cash transactions has coincided with the fall in cash
compliance.12
As discussed, a possible alternative explanation for the revenue decline, based
loosely on the Gaddy and Ickes (1998) model of the virtual economy, is that enter-
prises don’t choose cash compliance, but pay in cash as much as they can out of
their available resources. In this case, cash compliance can be increased only at the
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12Table 5 in Hendley, Ickes, and Ryterman (1998), for example, shows a positive correlation between
the severity of an enterprise’s tax arrears and its reliance on barter and promissory notes in its transactions.expense of some other cash requirement, such as wages. Supposing this to be true,
one must still account for why cash revenue fell suddenly beginning in 1995. If
cash revenue is limited only by the true resources available to enterprises, what
would have caused these resources to have declined so suddenly?
While any number of stylized models can be contrived to link the virtual
economy to the revenue decline, one plausible explanation relates to the reduction
in cross-subsidization accompanying the fall in the inflation tax. Since households
hold the bulk of base money, they also paid most of the inflation tax during the
period of high inflation. Part of the seigniorage is likely to have been used in one
form or another to subsidize loss-making enterprises, either in the form of govern-
ment expenditures or through central bank directed credits to industry. In this case,
the elimination of the inflation tax would represent an effective tax reduction for
households, and a corresponding reduction in subsidies to loss-making enter-
prises. Despite the loss of subsidies, these enterprises might continue to operate as
value-adding on paper through a tangle of barter arrangements and mutual non-
payments. As such, their measured tax liability would remain constant, even while
the real resources available to pay cash revenue has fallen.
Such an explanation certainly cannot be rejected outright and might possibly
account for part of the decline in cash revenue. The key question is, which is quan-
titatively more important for explaining the revenue decline: (1) a reduction in
cross-subsidization to loss-making enterprises; or (2) a reduction in the share of
true value added paid to the government? The answer is critical for determining
how to reverse the revenue decline. In the second case, as I have suggested, expen-
diture would need to be cut to the point that the government is not expected to rely
on non-cash forms of financing, and can pursue an enforcement policy aimed at
the long-run goal of raising compliance regardless of the short-run consequences.
In the first case, cutting expenditure, seizing assets, and establishing a reputation
would do nothing in the short run to raise cash revenue. In fact, expenditure cuts—
to the extent that expenditures are a form of subsidy—might actually reduce
compliance in the short run, until the loss-making enterprises are shut down and
the resources they use channeled into value-adding activities.
In this regard, the case of the automobile producer AvtoVAZ is revealing.
Although AvtoVAZ produces a good that enjoys a large cash market, it has for
some time retained the status of the single largest tax debtor in the Russian
economy. And, while the enterprise is no doubt inefficient, it would be difficult to
describe it as value-subtracting. AvtoVAZ pays a small fraction of its tax liability
not because there are no true profits to be made in production and sales of auto-
mobiles, but because the enterprise has not been left with any cash flow. Enterprise
managers are widely believed to have used barter and money surrogates to channel
all the cash flow from the manufacture and sales of automobiles to the legally
separate retail arm LogoVAZ, while at the same time using transfer pricing to shift
the bulk of the tax liability to AvtoVAZ. Since LogoVAZ no doubt pays close to
its full share of federal tax liability, enforcing cash compliance in the current legal
environment would require shutting down AvtoVAZ. The extent to which the
economy is represented by enterprises such as AvtoVAZ or by, say, value-
subtracting defense manufacturers is an open question.
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This Appendix describes a simple game between the government and enter-
prises in which cash compliance is induced by the threat that the government will
seize assets. In response to non-payment, the government chooses its optimal
seizure policy balancing the revenue gained from seizing assets against the alter-
native of using unpaid tax liabilities as an imperfect substitute to cash for
financing a chosen expenditure target. In this game, a decrease in non-revenue
financing paradoxically increases the government’s willingness to tolerate lower
cash compliance when formulating its seizure policy. It increases the likelihood,
moreover, that enterprises will challenge government’s commitment to its policy
of seizure, resulting in a further worsening of cash compliance.
First I consider the outcome assuming the government can pre-commit to a
seizure policy. I then compare this to the case where the government cannot pre-
commit, but rather adjusts its policy in response to enterprise behavior.
I. The Government Can Pre-Commit to a Seizure Policy
The game can be thought to take place sequentially. In the first step, the
government determines and then pre-commits to a seizure policy. As an alternative
to seizing assets, the government considers allowing enterprises to use unpaid tax
liabilities as an imperfect substitute for cash to finance its expenditure target, in
effect allowing enterprises to pay these taxes in kind. In the second step, each
enterprise determines its optimal level of compliance so as to minimize its costs,
balancing the cost of paying taxes against the likelihood that the government will
seize assets if it does not pay. When formulating its seizure policy in the first step,
the government anticipates the optimal response of enterprises to its policy in the
second step. A key assumption of the model is that the cash value of the seized
assets to the government is less in ruble terms than the value of the unpaid tax
liability, if the government instead uses it to finance expenditures.
Enterprises’ optimal tax compliance
To  solve the model, it is useful to first consider enterprises’ optimal tax
compliance for a given seizure policy and then to solve for the optimal seizure
policy taking into account enterprises’ optimal response. 
Each enterprise i chooses a level of cash compliance to minimize its costs:
minφiφiti + v(1 – φi)ti + piCi. (1)
An enterprise’s total costs equal its cash compliance (φi) times the enterprise’s
total tax liability (ti), plus the cost of paying taxes in kind (v < 1) times the unpaid
tax liability, plus the probability of seizure (pi) multiplied by the cost to the enter-
prise of having its assets seized (Ci).
A crucial element of the game is how enterprises perceive the probability of
seizure. One can think of the government as announcing its intention to seize
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chosen their tax compliance, the government will rank enterprises according to tax
compliance plus some random adjustment factor, unknown to the enterprises,
which might reflect factors such as the enterprise’s lobby power, social impor-
tance, etc. The government then intends to seize assets from lowest to highest until
it reaches its target number of enterprises.
Although I don’t explicitly model the mechanics of such a seizure policy, I
capture its essence in the following formulation. Each enterprise perceives the
probability of seizure to be
pi = f(p, φi), (2)
where p is the share of enterprises to be targeted by the government. An enterprise
understands that the higher this share, the greater the chances that, for a given level
of compliance, its assets will be seized. The function f (p, φi) is assumed to take a
form such that the probability of seizure can be charted as Figure A1. This func-
tional form implies that, as an enterprise’s compliance falls, the chances of seizure
become increasingly larger.
The enterprise solves its cost minimizing equation (1) taking into account the
probability of seizure for a given government policy p. From this equation, the cost
minimizing ϕi (denoted as ϕi*) will be that which solves:
ti(1 – v) = –f2(p, φi*) Ci (3)
Net marginal cost  Marginal value of reducing 
of tax payments  = the probability of seizure.
Enterprises will increase compliance until the net marginal cost of paying
taxes in cash is equal to the marginal value of reducing the probability of seizure.
The optimal compliance will be a function of the cost of paying taxes in kind, the
government’s seizure policy, and the cost of seizure.
As a simplifying convention, enterprises are assumed to be identical. This
allows the industry average cash compliance to be derived directly from the enter-
prise’s optimization in equation (3), which is expressed as follows:







Figure A1φ* = φ(p, C, v)
(4) φ1 >0,φ2 >0, φ3 >0,
where average compliance is an increasing function of the government’s seizure
activity, the costs of seizure, and the cost to the enterprise of tax payments in kind.
One noteworthy, although not surprising, implication of the enterprise’s opti-
mization is that for a given seizure policy, overall compliance will be lower to the
extent that random factors, such as lobby power and social importance, factor into
the government’s decision to seize assets. In terms of the model, a greater random-
ness to the seizure process would be reflected in the limited ability of the enter-
prise to reduce its seizure risk by raising compliance, or in a lower value for φ2 in
equation (4). All else equal, this would have the effect of reducing the marginal
benefit of raising compliance, and, to restore equilibrium, enterprises would
reduce compliance until the marginal benefits equaled the marginal costs.
The government’s optimal seizure policy
In deriving the government’s optimal seizure policy, start by assuming that the
government (taken here to mean the fiscal authorities) wishes to finance a given
expenditure target, net of borrowing and seigniorage. This net target is assumed to
be exogenous in the model. It can finance this net target either by collecting cash
from enterprises or by collecting taxes in non-cash form. Non-cash tax payments
can be understood to take place either directly in kind or through mutual arrears
clearing arrangements such as offsets. All else equal, the government is assumed
to prefer cash both because it is more fungible and because some expenditures,
such as wage payments and debt service, simply cannot be paid in kind or offset.
The government’s preferences, then, can be characterized by the following
utility function:
U(E – A, R)( 5 )
u1 < 0u11 < 0 (6) u2 > 0u22 < 0,
where E is the expenditure target net of borrowing and seigniorage, which is
assumed to be exogenous, R is cash revenue, and A is total cash and non-cash
revenue. Based on this utility function, the government will be indifferent between
cash revenue and total revenue as charted in Figure A2.
For a given expenditure target, government would be indifferent to having
lower cash revenue if it had sufficiently higher total revenue. At lower levels of
cash revenue, however, the amount of increased total revenue needed to leave the
government indifferent is greater.
The government determines its seizure policy to maximize utility:
maxp U(E – A, R)( 7 )
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A = (1 – p)T + pQ
(8) R = φT + pQ,
where p is, as before, the probability of seizure, T is the total tax liability, and Q
is the cash proceeds the government recovers from seizing assets, which is
assumed to be exogenous for the purposes of this model. Total revenue A is
comprised of cash revenue paid voluntarily by enterprises and non-cash revenue
for those enterprises from which the government chooses to accept payment in
kind (the sum of which is (1 – p) T), plus cash proceeds from seizure. Cash
revenue is determined by cash compliance plus cash proceeds from seizure.
The government sets its seizure policy anticipating the cost-minimizing reac-
tion of enterprises in equation (4). Combining this reaction with equations (7) and
(8) and, to simplify, setting the total tax liability T equal to one, the government’s
optimization becomes
maxpU(E – (1 – p) –pQ,φ(p, C, v) + p Q). (9)
The utility maximizing p (denoted p*) is that which solves the first-order condition:
u2(p*)(φ1(p*, C, v) + Q) = –u1(p*)(1 – Q) (10)
Marginal utility of Marginal disutility of
cash from seizure = net loss of total
policy revenue from seizure.
The government will set a seizure policy at that point where the marginal utility of
cash, both arising directly from seized assets as well as from greater compliance,
equals the marginal disutility that arises from a net loss of total revenue. The
component φ1—the change in compliance with respect to a change in frequency
of seizure—can be understood to represent the signal effect of a stated government
seizure policy on cash compliance.







Figure A2To  understand the effects of the exogenous variables on the government’s
optimal seizure policy, it is useful to show the optimization problem graphically in
terms of the tradeoff between total revenue and seizure policy p, where the policy
is in effect set to target a level of cash revenue. Cash revenue R is substituted from
the constraints in equation (8), combined with the enterprise reaction function in
equation (4) directly into the utility function in equation (7). Utility can now be
expressed as a function of total revenue A and seizure policy p and is maximized
subject to the constraint on total revenue in equation (8). The optimal seizure
policy p* that solves equation (10) is shown as point a in Figure A3.
An increase in cash receipts from seizure (Q) will increase the efficiency of
seizure. If the substitution effects of this efficiency gain exceed the income effects
of higher cash revenue for a given seizure policy, an increase in Q will result in an
increased effort by the government to seize, shown in the first panel of Figure A4
as a shift from point a to point b. In terms of equation (10), an increase in Q
increases the marginal benefit of seizure while at the same time reducing the
marginal cost in terms of lost total revenue. Increasing cash revenue by increasing
the probability of seizure p will decrease the government’s marginal utility of cash
(u2), restoring equality in equation (10). By equation (4), cash compliance will
increase.
An increase in the government’s expenditure target or a decrease in non-
revenue financing (an increase in E) will reduce the government’s willingness to
seize assets. This is shown in the second panel of Figure A4. As E increases, so
does the marginal disutility of the financing shortfall (u1). To restore balance to
equation (10), the government will forgo cash revenue by reducing p to the point
where the higher marginal utility of cash revenue offsets the higher disutility of the
financing shortfall. With a less aggressive seizure policy, cash compliance of
enterprises will be correspondingly lower.
Finally, when either the cost to enterprises of seizure (C) or the cost of paying
taxes in kind (ν) increases, enterprises react to a given seizure policy by increasing
compliance (equation (4)). Although cash revenue unambiguously increases, the
effect on seizure policy is ambiguous, depending on the impact of these changes
on the signal value of seizure. On the one hand, the increase in cash revenue will







A = 1 – (1 – Q)p
p
Figure A3
1want to reduce seizures and increase total revenue. On the other hand, if increases
in C or ν increase the effectiveness of seizure policy on compliance, then this will
lead the government to want to increase its seizure activity. The net effect will
depend on the relative size of these two effects.
II. The Government Cannot Pre-Commit to a Seizure Policy
The case where the government cannot pre-commit to a seizure policy will
now be considered. In the pre-commitment case, the government first determined
a seizure policy as in equation (10), and then, in the second step, enterprises
determined their optimal level of compliance and paid taxes according to this
level. Once enterprises paid, the government then carried out its pre-announced
policy. In this sequence, however, the government’s behavior is not time consis-
tent; once enterprises chose compliance and then pay, the government no longer
has an incentive to carry out its seizure policy. In terms of the model, the govern-
ment’s optimal p, which it determines ex ante, is greater than optimal p, which it
would prefer to carry out ex post.
To see this, the government’s optimal seizure policy is solved by taking the
level of cash compliance as given. In this case, as before, the government solves
maxpU(E – A,φ + pQ) (11)
subject to the constraint
A = 1 – (1 – Q)p (12)
but now taking φ as exogenous. The optimal ex post seizure policy p (denoted p**)
solves the following first-order condition:
u2 (p**)Q = – (1 – Q)u1 (p**). (13)















Increase in Q Increase in EComparing this to the optimal seizure policy p* given in equation (10), it is
clear that since φ1 > 0 it must be the case that p** < p* for any value of φ. Once
enterprises choose their tax compliance and taxes are paid, the government can no
longer influence compliance through its seizure policy, and the marginal gain to
seizure is only the additional cash proceeds from seizing assets. At this point, the
government will prefer to deviate from its stated seizure policy by increasing the
use of tax liabilities to reduce its financing shortfall.
As can be seen from equation (14), moreover, the incentive to deviate from the
stated seizure policy increases with compliance. As compliance increases, the
marginal utility from cash revenue declines, inducing the government to seize less
and finance more expenditures through non-cash revenue. The ex post optimal
seizure policy, therefore, will be a declining function of compliance:
p** = p(φ) (14)
p′ < 0.
Enterprises, of course, can be expected to take into account the government’s ex
post behavior when deciding their optimal cash compliance, in effect challenging
the government’s stated intention to seize assets. In this case, the inability of the
government to pre-commit leads enterprises to lower cash compliance further.
To determine optimal compliance, enterprises now minimize costs taking into
account the government’s optimal ex post seizure policy determined in equation
(16). As before, each enterprise minimizes
minφiφiti + v(1 – φi)ti + piCi , (15)
where its own probability of seizure is now expressed as
pi = f(p**(φ),φi). (16)
The value of φi (denoted φi**) which maximizes each enterprise’s utility is
that which solves
ti(1 – v) = –f2(p(φ), φi**)Ci. (17)
In contrast to the pre-commitment case, enterprises now determine their own
compliance based on their expectation of overall compliance. While each enter-
prise is assumed to perceive itself as too small for its own behavior to affect overall
compliance, it nonetheless knows that all other enterprises are determining their
own compliance in a similar manner. Since all enterprises are identical, the equi-
librium overall compliance will be the point in equation (17) where
φ** = φi** = φ.
The resulting equilibrium can be compared to the pre-commitment equilib-
rium graphically. As in equation (4), enterprises will respond to a higher proba-
bility of seizure by increasing compliance. This is represented by the
upward-sloping curve φ(p) in Figure A5. In the pre-commitment case, the govern-
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occur at point a. Ex post, however, the government would prefer to deviate from
its announced seizure policy by choosing a lower p corresponding to the
downward-sloping curve p(φ) in equation (16). At the level of compliance φ* the
government would choose to a p corresponding to point b. Enterprises, of course,
anticipating the government’s ex post response, will select a lower compliance
corresponding to point c, the equilibrium described by equation (17). This equi-
librium is characterized by both lower compliance and fewer seizures than in the
case where the government can pre-commit.
III. The Cost of Pre-Commitment
If the government views the process of seizure as a repeated game, it might be
willing to endure some short-run costs of pre-commitment because it is worried
about moral hazard and is seeking to establish a reputation. However, the govern-
ment’s cost of adhering to an announced seizure policy is itself a function of the
expenditure target net of non-revenue financing. In this case, an increase in the
expenditure target net of non-revenue financing might increase costs to the point
that the pre-commitment itself loses credibility. As a result, compliance would fall
by much more than would be the case under pre-commitment as enterprises began
challenging the stated seizure policy.
From equations (10) and (15), the net marginal utility lost from adhering to a
pre-committed seizure policy will be
–u1(p*)(1 – Q) – u2(p*)Q > 0. (18)
As discussed above, there is an ex post incentive for the government to forgo
seizure and divert the unpaid tax liability toward financing its expenditure target.
If the expenditure target (E) is small, then the pre-commitment equilibrium will be














φ** φ φ*characterized by a large p* and low marginal utility levels –u1(p*) and u2(p*). In
this case, the marginal utility gained by deviating ex post from a seizure policy is
accordingly small. If, on the other hand, E is large, the equilibrium will be char-
acterized by a small p* and high marginal utility levels –u1(p*) and u2(p*).
Therefore, equation (18) shows that an increase in the expenditure target or a
decrease in non-revenue financing would increase the marginal utility gained by
deviating ex post from a seizure policy. This has the important implication that an
increase in the expenditure target or a decrease in non-revenue financing can lead
to a collapse in compliance and, at the same time, a reduction in the number of
seizures, both by reducing the government’s willingness to engage in a policy of
seizure and by reducing the government’s ex post commitment to such a policy.
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